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A PROSECUTOR'S USE OF INCONSISTENT FACTUAL
THEORIES OF A CRIME IN SUCCESSIVE TRIALS:
ZEALOUS ADVOCACY OR A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION?
Michael Q. English'
INTRODUCTION

Prosecutors face a dilemma when two people engage in criminal
activity, but only one of the perpetrators commits the most serious
offense. In some cases, the evidence clearly establishes that the most
serious offense, oftentimes murder, was committed by only one
person. The evidence frequently does not, however, confirm which of
the suspects committed this offense. Moreover, circumstantial
evidence often suggests that either suspect could have committed the
offense. Thus, knowing that one of the two suspects committed the
offense, prosecutors face a difficult choice: they can choose not to
charge either suspect, charge only one of the suspects, or charge both
suspects with the same criminal act.
In an increasing number of cases, prosecutors have chosen the third
alternative and charged two suspects with the same crime knowing
that only one of the suspects is in fact guilty. Most significantly, in an
attempt to convict both suspects, prosecutors have argued patently
inconsistent factual theories of the crime at each suspect's trial.
Consider the following three cases.
1.

Thompson v. Calderon'

Prosecutors charged both Thomas Thompson and David Leitch
with the murder of Ginger Fleischli.2 At Thompson's trial, the
prosecutor argued that Thompson alone killed Fleischli after raping
her. 3 The prosecutor called two jailhouse informants who testified
that Thompson confessed to them about murdering Fleischli in
order to cover up the rape.4 The prosecutor called the two
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Fordham University School of Law. This Note is
dedicated to my wife, Nomita, and my parents, Micaela and Frank English. I would
like to thank Professor Bruce A. Green for his insight and guidance in writing this
Note.
1. 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), revd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
2. See i. at 1055.
3. See id at 1056.

4. See id.
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informants' testimony "dispositive" and "very, very damaging" to
Thompson.5 In his closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that
Thompson was solely responsible for the crime and that there was
no evidence placing Leitch at the murder scene at the time of the
murder.6 A jury convicted Thompson of first-degree murder and
rape, and sentenced him to death.7
At Leitch's trial, however, the same prosecutor argued that
Leitch, not Thompson, killed Fleischli. The prosecutor called a
different set of witnesses for Leitch's trial,' most of whom had
served as defense witnesses during Thompson's trial. 9 In fact, the
prosecutor had objected to these witnesses' testimony at
Thompson's trial. 10 Nevertheless, at Leitch's trial these witnesses
testified that Leitch had a violent disposition and a motive for killing
Fleischli-she was preventing him from reuniting with his former
wife." In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Leitch
was the only one who had a motive to kill Fleischli.1 He also argued
that both Leitch and Thompson were inside Leitch's apartment
13
when Fleischli was murdered.
The jury convicted Leitch of
14
murder.
second-degree
2. Nichols v. Collins15
During the course of a robbery at Joseph's Delicatessen and
Grocery in Houston, Texas, one of the perpetrators of the robbery
shot and killed Claude Shaffer, Jr., an employee of Joseph's. 6 The
evidence established that Shaffer died from a single gunshot wound,
but the police were unable to determine which of the two
perpetrators-Joseph Nichols or Willie Williams-fired the fatal
shot. 17 Before Nichols's trial, Williams pled guilty to a charge of
"intentionally caus[ing] the death of [Shaffer] by shooting him with a
gun." 18 At the punishment phase of Williams's trial, the prosecutor
asserted that "Willie Williams is the individual who shot and killed
Claude Shaffer.... [T]here is only one bullet that could possibly
have done it and that was Willie Williams'[s] [bullet]."' 9 A jury

5. Id.
6. See id. at 1057.
7. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538,544 (1998).
8. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1056.
9. See id.
10. See id.

11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1057.
14. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 544 (1998).
15. 802 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Tex. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255
(5th Cir. 1995).
16. See id. at 68.

17. See Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1995).
18. Nichols, 802 F. Supp. at 72 (internal quotations omitted).

19. Id. at 73 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
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sentenced Williams to death. 0
Subsequently, the prosecutor charged Nichols with "intentionally
caus[in the death of Claude Shaffer, Jr.,... by shooting [him] with
a gun." During closing arguments at Nichols's trial, the prosecutor
argued that "Willie could not have shot [Shaffer].... [Nichols] fired
the fatal bullet and killed the man in cold blood and he should
answer for that." The jury convicted Nichols of capital murder
and, after a separate punishment phase, sentenced him to death. 3
3.

Jacobs v. Sco

4

Prosecutors charged both Jesse Jacobs and his sister, Bobbie
Hogan, with the murder of Etta Urdiales. 2s Jacobs had confessed to
Urdiales's abduction and murder after his arrest.' At his trial,
however, Jacobs testified that his confession was false.' He claimed
that although he abducted Urdiales, Hogan had shot and killed
her?' The prosecutor argued that "[t]he simple fact of the matter is
that Jesse Jacobs and Jesse Jacobs alone killed Etta Ann
Urdiales." 29 The jury found Jacobs guilty of capital murder and
sentenced him to death. 30
During Hogan's trial, however, the same prosecutor claimed that
he had been wrong in Jacobs's trial. 31 He now argued that Hogan,
not Jacobs, shot Urdiales. The prosecutor called Jacobs to testify
that Hogan had killed Urdiales and then argued that "I changed my
mind about what actually happened. And I'm convinced that
Bobbie Hogan is the one who pulled the trigger. And I'm convinced
that Jesse Jacobs is telling the truth when he says that Bobbie Hogan
is the one that pulled the trigger." 33 The jury found Hogan guilty of
involuntary manslaughter.' Hogan received a sentence of ten years
in prison.
In each of these cases, one prosecutor argued patently inconsistent
theories of the same crime in successive trials. This tactic enabled the
20. See id. at 72.
21. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

22 Id. at 73 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
23. See id at 72.
24. 31 F.3d 1319 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067 (1995)

(denying Jacob's application for a stay of sentence of death).
25.
26.
27.
28

See Jacobs,31 F.3d at 1320.
See id. at 1321.
See id.
See id.

31.
3233.
34.

See id.
See id. at 1322 n.6.
Id.
See id. at 1322.

29. Id. at 1322 n.6 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
30. See i. at 1322. It is unclear whether the jury convicted Jacobs as the
triggerman or as a conspirator because under the Texas statute, the jury could convict
him of murder for either role. See id.
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prosecutor to convict two people of a single criminal act that the
prosecutor acknowledged could only have been committed by one
individual.
This Note addresses the constitutional and ethical issues raised by
the prosecutors' conduct in the cases described above. This Note
argues that a prosecutor violates both the Due Process Clause and her
ethical obligations when she argues inconsistent factual theories of a
crime in successive trials without taking affirmative steps to repudiate
the factual theory used in the first trial. Part I examines the
prosecutor's role in the American criminal justice system. It then
explores the prosecutor's charging discretion and discusses the
prosecutor's constitutional and ethical limitations during trial. Part II
identifies and analyzes how courts have responded to a prosecutor's
use of inconsistent factual theories in successive trials. Part III argues
that prosecutors violate due process when they present patently
inconsistent theories of a crime in successive trials. This part asserts
that this prosecutorial tactic violates the Due Process Clause because
it breaches the fundamental principle of our criminal justice system
that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than to let a guilty
person go free. This Note contends that the risk of convicting an
innocent person is so substantial when a prosecutor argues
inconsistent factual theories in successive trials that such conduct
cannot withstand due process scrutiny. Finally, this Note concludes
that prosecutors also violate their ethical duty to "seek justice" when
arguing inconsistent theories of a crime in successive trials.
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS

This part begins by examining the prosecutor's role in the American
criminal justice system. It then analyzes the prosecutor's charging
discretion and explores whether the probable cause standard provides
sufficient protection to defendants. Finally, it discusses a prosecutor's
constitutional limitations at trial.
A. The Prosecutor'sHeightened Duty in the CriminalJustice System
Prosecutors play a unique role in the administration of criminal
justice." Serving as the state or federal government's representative
in criminal litigation,36 prosecutors exercise almost unlimited
discretion in the performance of their duties.3 7 As representatives of
the state or federal government, prosecutors are held to higher

35. See John Jay Douglass, Ethical Issues in Prosecution 1 (1988); Carol A.
Corrigan, On ProsecutorialEthics, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 537, 537 (1986).
36. See Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity at xv

(1980).
37. See Douglass, supra note 35, at 1; see also infra part I.B.
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standards than other trial lawyers s Unlike lawyers representing
individual clients, who are obligated to represent their clients
zealously within
the bounds of the law, 39 prosecutors are required to
"seek justice."' 40 This duty includes ensuring that a defendant's trial is
fair and that the proceedings appear fair to the public.4' The Supreme
Court highlighted prosecutors' unique duty to ensure the fairness of
the outcome of a criminal proceeding in Berger v. United States.! The
Berger Court found that:
[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall
43
win a case, but that justice shall be done.
In order to carry out their distinct duty to "seek justice,"
prosecutors possess a dual role as both an advocate and a "minister of
justice." 44 While this dual role is nowhere clearly defined, the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct assert that the dual role "carries
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence." 45 Trying to balance the quasi-judicial role of protecting the
innocent and the advocate's role of pursuing convictions can be a
difficult task. 6 In fact, one former prosecutor candidly described the
attempt to satisfy this dual role as "ongoing schizophrenia."'
Faced with these seemingly conflicting roles, prosecutors must
determine which role takes priority in a given situation. s For
example, when prosecutors evaluate cases for prosecution, they
38. See Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor'sResponsibility
When Defense Counsel Hasa PotentialConflict of Interest, 16 Am. J.Crim. L 323, 324
(1989) [hereinafter Green, Brother'sKeeper].
39. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1 (1980).
40. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13; see also Standards
Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.2(c) (1992).
41. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
National District Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards, Standard
25.1 cmt. (1977) ("As a public prosecutor constantly in the public eye, it is imperative
that the prosecutor... avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."); see
also Green, Brother'sKeeper, supra note 38, at 324-25.
42. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
43. Id. at 88.
44. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. (1997); see also Standards
Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.2(b) (stating that the
prosecutor must exercise sound discretion as an administrator of justice); Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J.1159, 1218 (1958)
(addressing prosecutors' responsibilities within their dual role).
45. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt.
46. See Kenneth J. MeliUi, ProsecutorialDiscretion in an Adversary System, 1992
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 669, 697; see also Douglass, supra note 35, at 24-25.
47. Melilli, supra note 46, at 698.
48. See id. at 697-98.
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exercise their quasi-judicial role as "ministers of justice."4 9 At trial,
however, while not losing sight of their ongoing obligation to
administer justice, prosecutors assume the role of zealous advocates in
pursuit of convictions.50 The Supreme Court confirmed the need for
prosecutors to act as zealous advocates in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.5 1
The Marshall Court held that prosecutors "need not be entirely
neutral and detached." 2 Rather, the Court noted that "[i]n an
adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily
permitted to be
53
zealous in their enforcement of the law.
Nowhere is the unique role of prosecutors more apparent than at
trial. Like their dual role and their "seek justice" admonition,
prosecutors' trial obligations differ significantly from those of other
lawyers 4 First, prosecutors must disclose to the defense any
exculpatory evidence within their possession that is material either to
the defendant's guilt or punishment.5 1 Second, prosecutors must
disclose to the defense any material evidence within their possession6
that may be used to impeach the testimony of prosecution witnesses.1
Finally, prosecutors may not intentionally avoid the pursuit of
evidence merely because it will damage their case."
These requirements illustrate the seriousness with which American
courts regard criminal convictions. Indeed, American criminal
procedure provides defendants with substantial protections to ensure
that innocent people are not convicted. For example, in In re
Winship5 8 the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant can only
be convicted when every fact necessary to constitute the crime for
which he is charged is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.5 9 The
Court found that this high standard was "indispensable" in order to
give substance to the presumption of innocence and to "safeguard
men from dubious and unjust convictions."' Furthermore, as Justice
Harlan noted in his concurring opinion in Winship, the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard is grounded "on a fundamental value
judgment of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
49. See Jacoby, supra note 36, at xxii.
50. See id.
51. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
52. Id. at 248 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972)).
53. Id.
54. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1980) ("With respect
to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities different from those of a
lawyer in private practice ....
").
55. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
56. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
57. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1980).
58. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
59. See id. at 364 (finding the beyond a reasonable doubt standard necessary to
ensure that innocent people are not condemned).
60. Id. at 362-64.
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than to let a guilty man go free. '61
The protections accorded criminal defendants account for the vastly
different roles that the prosecutor and the defense attorney play at
trial. Justice White explained these distinct roles in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in United States v. Wade:6
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty
and to make sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be
dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure for the
ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the
crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system is not
adversary at all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no
comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our system
assigns him a different mission. He must be and is interested in
preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary
plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his client whether he is
innocent or guilty.'
These distinct roles also exist because prosecutors represent the
government, and as such, have no identifiable client.64 Instead,
prosecutors represent the interests of society as a whole, including the
interests of the defendant as a member of that society. In practice,
however, the prosecutor makes decisions on behalf of the government
and, in effect, defines the public interest in specific cases.6
This ability to define the public interest exemplifies the tremendous
power that prosecutors possess. Former Attorney General and
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson believed that a prosecutor
has "more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other
person in America."' Indeed, prosecutors maintain considerable
influence, if not total control, over investigations, arrests, indictments,
and sentences. 6s In a recent article, Professor Gerard E. Lynch
61. Id. at 372.
62. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

63. Id at 256-57 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (footnote

omitted); see also Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Do Honest Prosecutors Engage in
Misconduct?, Foreword to Joseph F. Lawless, Jr., Prosecutorial Misconduct at ix, xvi
(1985) ("In brief, the prosecutor is supposed to help the defendant-in a variety of
ways-to secure an acquittal, especially by providing him with useful evidence;
whereas the defense attorney rarely, if ever, is supposed to help the prosecutor secure
a conviction.").
64. See Melilli, supra note 46, at 698.
65. See id.; see also Corrigan,supra note 35, at 538-39.
66. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 607, 633 (1999) [hereinafter Green, Seek Justice]; Melil, supra note 46, at
698.
67. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor (Address Delivered at the Second
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, Apr. 1, 1940), reprintedin 31 J. Am.
Inst. L. & Criminology 3,3 (1940).
68. See id.; see also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal
Justice,66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117,2124-29 (1998) (noting that prosecutors possess the
unilateral authority to decide what to investigate, as well as the de facto authority to
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highlights prosecutors' increasing power.69 Professor Lynch argues
that prosecutors have become de facto administrators who, because of
the prevalence of plea bargaining within our criminal justice system,
have the unilateral power to determine "whether an accused will be
subject to social sanction, and if so, how much punishment will be
imposed."70 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged prosecutors'
tremendous power and the need for prosecutors to exercise this power
judiciously. In Young v. United States,71 the Court found that:

[b]etween the private life of the citizen and the public glare of
criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That state official has the
power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any
given individual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced
immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching
disruption of everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance
that those who would wield this power will be guided solely by their
sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice.
Thus, armed with immense power and responsibility, prosecutors
attempt to "seek justice" while at the same time advocating on behalf
of the sovereign that they represent.
B. The Prosecutor'sChargingDiscretion
The charging decision is the heart of a prosecutor's power.73
Prosecutors have virtually unlimited discretion to determine which
cases and defendants to prosecute, as well as what charges to bring.74
In addition, prosecutors retain the right to revisit the initial charging
decision at a later date. This section examines the prosecutor's
charging discretion. In addition, this section explores the debate
surrounding the level of certainty of a suspect's guilt that a prosecutor
must have in order to charge the suspect with a crime.
1. The Prosecutor's Threshold Level of Certainty of a Suspect's Guilt
The cases described in the Introduction to this Note76 raise
questions regarding the threshold level of certainty in a suspect's guilt
required for a prosecutor to charge that suspect with a crime.
Furthermore, the cases raise the question of a prosecutor's
alternatives when she knows that one of two people committed a
determine the suspect's guilt or innocence and, when appropriate, sentence).
69. See Lynch, supra note 68, at 2124-29.
70. Id. at 2135.
71. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
72. Id. at 814.
73. See David C. James, The Prosecutor's Discretionary Screening and Charging
Authority, Prosecutor, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 22,22.
74. See Melilli, supra note 46, at 672.
75. See id. at 673.
76. See supra notes 1-34 and accompanying text.
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criminal act, but is unsure which suspect to charge. Although due
process 7 requires that a conviction be based on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt,7 prosecutors have no comparable requirement of
certainty at the charging stage.79 Instead, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal
Justice agree that a prosecutor need only have "probable cause '"m to
institute charges against a suspect.8 1 It is important to note that these
ethical codes do not purport to encompass a lawyer's full obligation,
but rather establish a minimum level of conduct that lawyers cannot
transgress;-' nevertheless, these authorities uniformly conclude that
probable cause is the minimum standard required to charge a suspect
with a crime.
The Supreme Court has also confirmed that prosecutors need only
satisfy the "probable cause" standard. As the Court stated in Wayte v.
United States,.' "[s]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."' The
only constitutional limitation on prosecutors is that they cannot
institute charges based on an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary characteristic 5 Thus, while the ABA
ethical codes and the Constitution find that probable cause is a
sufficient standard to charge a defendant, the question remains
whether this standard satisfies the prosecutor's "seek justice"
mandate.
2. Is "Probable Cause" Sufficient?
The probable cause standard has been the center of much debate
77. The Supreme Court found that procedural due process expresses "the
requirement of 'fundamental fairness,' a requirement whose meaning can be as
opaque as its importance is lofty." Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
24 (1981). For a more detailed discussion of the Due Process Clause, see infra part
I.C.1.
7& See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970).
79. See Melilli, supra note 46, at 682.
80. "[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.... [It] does not
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false."
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,742 (1983).
81. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(A) (1980); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(a) (1997); Standards Relating to the Admin.
of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.9(a) (1992).
82. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility Preliminary Statement
("The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.").
83. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
84. Id. at 607 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,364 (1978)).
85. See id. at 608.
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among scholars and prosecutors. Some commentators claim that the
minimal requirement of probable cause does not provide a sufficient
safeguard to protect suspects from the potential expense, anxiety, and
embarrassment of criminal proceedings. 6 Other commentators feel
that this standard accurately reflects the prosecutor's role in the
criminal justice process.'
There are two opposing views concerning a prosecutor's role in the
charging decision. The first view argues that a prosecutor's role is
merely that of a conduit, one who presents the evidence that the
police have obtained to the grand jury and, if the grand jury indicts
the suspect, to the trial jury. 88 The second view argues that a
prosecutor must be personally satisfied of a suspect's guilt before
instituting charges against that suspect.89 This section will discuss and
analyze both views in depth.
a. "Leave the Decision to the Jury"
Some prosecutors and commentators argue that a prosecutor is
obligated to leave the question of a suspect's guilt or innocence to the
jury.9° They insist that a prosecutor's role is that of an advocate and,
therefore, the prosecutor should present the strongest possible case
against the defendant without conducting an independent assessment
of the suspect's guilt.91 This view holds that the prosecutor is a
conduit who should first present the evidence to the grand jury92 and
let the grand jury decide whether to bring criminal charges against a
suspect.93 If the grand jury decides to indict the suspect, then the
prosecutor should present the evidence and let the trial jury decide
the suspect's guilt.94 According to this view, a prosecutor's decision
86. See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 Harv.
L. Rev. 1521, 1525 & n.13 (1981) (arguing that prosecutors should be held more
accountable for their decisions).
87. See infra part I.B.2.a.
88. See infra part I.B.2.a.
89. See infra part I.B.2.b.
90. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1075 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("It is up to the jury, not the prosecutor, to decide what
happened amidst a lot of lies."), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); see also Green, Seek
Justice,supra note 66, at 640 (criticizing this view of a prosecutor's role); Melilli, supra
note 46, at 692 (same); H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an
Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1155-59 (1973)
("[W]hen [a prosecutor] is honestly unable to judge where the truth of the matter lies,
I see no flaw in the conduct of the prosecutor who fairly lays the matter before the
judge or jury.").
91. See Green, Seek Justice, supra note 66, at 640 (criticizing this view); Melilli,
supra note 46, at 693 (same).
92. Grand jury indictments are only required in approximately one-half of the
states, and in those states the requirement is generally limited to felonies. See Melilli,
supra note 46, at 677.
93. See Green, Seek Justice,supra note 66, at 640.
94. See id. (criticizing this view); see also Melilli, supra note 46, at 692-93 (same).
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not to institute charges against a suspect because of doubts about the
suspect's guilt is an improper usurpation of the jury's role in the
criminal justice process.95
This view of the prosecutor's charging role is misguided. First, this
view discounts the prosecutor's influence over the grand jury." Critics
argue that grand juries serve merely as "rubber stamps" for
prosecutorsY7 These critics claim that because grand jury proceedings
are run by the prosecutor ex parte, the prosecutor exercises
considerable control over grand jury decisions. 9s As one critic points
out, "[a]nybody familiar -with the criminal justice system knows that
the grand jury does not act on its own and that the prosecutor controls
grand jury action." 99 In addition, the grand jury standard is merely
that of probable cause, which offers little, if any, screening of the
prosecutor's decision to institute charges against a suspect in the first
place. 101
Second, this view is premised on an unfounded faith in the
adversary system to determine truth.10 ' This view assumes that the
prosecutor should defer to the jury because the jury is in a better
position to determine the defendant's guilt. 2 This view also assumes
that juries will make the correct decision about the defendant's
guilt. 3 Logic and experience suggest that both of these assumptions
are erroneous. Experience suggests that juries and judges are
sometimes wrong in their factual conclusions. 04 As one former
prosecutor observed, "[flalse testimony is sometimes believed, and
accurate testimony is sometimes rejected."'10 Furthermore, despite
the evidence, verdicts are sometimes influenced by the skills and
personalities of the advocates.' 6 In addition, juries determine a
defendant's guilt based solely on the admissible evidence, whereas
prosecutors have more information-including the statements of
police, all the evidence collected in the investigation, and the suspect's
criminal history-upon which to make their determination of the
95. See Melilli, supra note 46, at 692-94.
96. See Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standardfor the Prosecutor'sExercise of
the ChargingDiscretion,20 Fordham Urb. LJ. 513, 520 (1993); Melili, supra note 46,
at 677.
97. Melili, supra note 46, at 677.
98. See id.
99. Gershman, supranote 96, at 520 (footnote omitted).
100. See Melilli, supra note 46, at 677.
101. See id. at 693.
102. See id.
103. See id
104. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting
that the triers of fact will sometimes be wrong in their factual conclusions); see also
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1993) (same); Gershman, supra note 96, at

521 (same).

105. Melili, supra note 46, at 694 (footnote omitted).
106. See id
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suspect's guilt."

Third, charging suspects solely on probable cause without
performing an independent evaluation of the suspect's guilt creates a
substantial risk of injustice.'l 8 Charging on such a minimal standard
creates too great a risk that an innocent person may be charged and
potentially convicted of a crime."'9 As one commentator states, "To
the extent that juries are politically motivated, succumb to
inflammatory appeals, or rely on ambiguous or uncertain proof, they
can convict innocent persons." 110 This risk should be unacceptable to
a prosecutor, for one of a prosecutor's paramount duties is protecting
innocent people from unjust convictions.'
Additionally, if an
innocent person is charged with a crime simply because the minimal
probable cause standard was met, prosecutors run the risk that the
true perpetrator of the crime will escape punishment. These factors
substantially undercut the credibility of the view that a prosecutor is
merely a conduit who should present the best evidence available
against a suspect. This view also ignores the fact that prosecutors
have an independent responsibility to review the evidence against a
suspect before deciding to bring charges." 3 When prosecutors do not
perform an independent review of the evidence and instead leave the
suspect's guilt entirely to the jury, they breach their professional
responsibility as prosecutors."4
b. Personal Certainty
A second view of the prosecutor's role in the charging decision is
that a prosecutor must be personally convinced of a suspect's guilt
before bringing charges." 5 This view includes a wide spectrum of
definitions of personal satisfaction of a suspect's guilt." 6 This view is
premised on the belief that it is unacceptable for the prosecutor to ask
jurors to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if the
107. See Uviller, supra note 90, at 1156-57.
108. See Corrigan, supra note 35, at 540.
109. See id.
110. Gershman, supra note 96, at 521.
111. See Green, Seek Justice,supra note 66, at 640; Melilli, supra note 46, at 699.
112 See Corrigan, supra note 35, at 540.
113. See id. at 539; Gershman, supra note 96, at 522; Green, Seek Justice, supra note
66, at 640-41; James, supra note 73, at 27; Melilli, supra note 46, at 701 n.263.
114. See James, supra note 73, at 27 (arguing that prosecutors must not abdicate the
charging discretion to others).
115. See Corrigan, supra note 35, at 539; Gershman, supra note 96, at 522; James,
supra note 73, at 27; Melilli, supra note 46, at 701.
116. Compare Corrigan, supra note 35, at 539 (requiring that prosecutors only
charge when they are "personally satisfied that the defendant is guilty"), with
Gershman, supra note 96, at 522 (arguing that prosecutors must be "morally certain"
of the defendant's guilt before instituting charges), and Melilli, supra note 46, at 701
(asserting that a prosecutor should not pursue cases unless "personally satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt").
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prosecutor herself has doubts about the defendant's guilt." 7 In short,
this view argues that if "the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard is a
necessary cushion against erroneous convictions by the trier of fact,
to 'seek
then how can prosecutors, in pursuit of their obligation
18
justice,' impose any lower standard upon themselves?'
Professor Bennett L. Gershman champions this view in a recent
article. 119 Professor Gershman insists that prosecutors should engage
in a moral struggle over their charging decisions rather than simply
This moral struggle,
instituting charges without deliberation."2
according to Professor Gershman, should involve rigorous intellectual
Professor Gershman believes that
and emotional scrutiny.
prosecutors should bring charges only if this scrutiny "yields a
conclusion that is so personally compelling that the prosecutor would
not hesitate to act on that decision in vital matters affecting the
prosecutor's own life."'" He posits that such a high standard is
necessary to fulfill the prosecutor's role as the "gatekeeper of
justice,"'m who has the responsibility to prevent injustice before the
system has an opportunity to miscarry.124 In short, Professor
Gershman acknowledges that his "moral certainty" standard requires
the same high level of confidence as the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard.'
A prosecutor's decision to institute charges only when personally
satisfied of the suspect's guilt complies with one of the underlying
principles of the American criminal justice system: protecting
innocent people from conviction.1 6 This standard provides suspects
with substantial protection against being charged with a crime that
they have not committed, while at the same time allowing prosecutors
to charge suspects whom they feel are truly guilty.12' This view also
accounts for the fact that the prosecutor will have more information
available to her than will the jury in making an informed decision
regarding the suspect's guilt. Moreover, forcing prosecutors to meet
their own personal standard of guilt will alleviate the prosecutor's
tendency to approach charging as a mere application of mechanical
rules. m This intense scrutiny by the prosecutor will also lessen the
117. See Meili, supra note 46, at 702; see also Corrigan,supra note 35, at 541.
118. Melili, supra note 46, at 700.
119. See Gershman, supra note 96, passim.

120. See id. at 522.
121. See id. at 522 n.18.
122- Id.
123. Id. at 521.
124. See id. at 521-23.
125. See id. at 522 n.18.
126. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting
that there exists "a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse
to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free").
127. See Gershman, supra note 96, at 522.
128. See James, supra note 73, at 22.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

prosecutor's tendency to develop "conviction psychology," a
syndrome characterized by excessive emphasis on obtaining
convictions rather than on seeking justice.1 29 Prosecutors can avoid
this tendency by examining the defendant's guilt from a juror's
perspective rather than from the perspective of a law enforcement
official.
One implication of this view is that prosecutors would spend more
time at the initial stage of the investigation to satisfy themselves of the
suspect's guilt before bringing charges. Meeting such a high standard
early in an investigation may prove quite taxing on prosecutors and
may necessitate a restructuring of the time allocation that prosecutors'
offices place on the charging decision. This time spent at the front
end of investigations should prove more efficient in the long run,
however, because prosecutors would not waste time with cases that
normally would be dismissed at a later stage because of doubts about
the suspect's guilt or lack of evidence. Most significantly, this view
provides individual citizens with far greater protection from being
charged with a crime that they have not committed.
Thus, there are conflicting views about what degree of certainty a
prosecutor should have about a suspect's guilt before bringing
criminal charges against the suspect. While these views do not reach a
consensus on a new charging standard, they do suggest that the
constitutional and ethical standard of probable cause should be
reexamined.
C. The Prosecutor'sEthicaland ConstitutionalLimitations During
Trial
The cases described in the Introduction 130 raise serious questions
concerning prosecutors' trial limitations. This section will first
examine the due process restrictions on a prosecutor before and
during trial. It will then explore the level of certainty that a
prosecutor must have in order to present factual arguments at trial.
1. The Prosecutor's Due Process Limitations
The Due Process Clause 131 guarantees a defendant the right to a
trial that comports with "fundamental fairness.' ' 32 Former Supreme
129. Melilli, supra note 46, at 689-90 (noting that even a conscientious prosecutor
can succumb to "conviction psychology" because of the high percentage of guilty
pleas and high conviction rate at trial).
130. See supra notes 1-34 and accompanying text.

131. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
provide that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.... " U.S. Const. amend. V; accordid. amend. XIV, § 1.
132. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); accord In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
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Court Justice Douglas highlighted the importance of this right in
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, where he asserted that "[t]hose who
have experienced the full thrust of the power of government when
leveled against them know that the only protection the citizen has is in
the requirement for a fair trial."''" However, the Supreme Court has
found that determining what the due process requirement of
"fundamental fairness"135consists of in a particular situation is an
"uncertain enterprise."'
The Supreme Court has instructed that
because due process cannot be precisely defined, courts must discover
the meaning of "fundamental fairness" by first considering any
relevant precedents and then assessing the interests at stake.13
In Smith v. Phillips,137 a due process case involving prosecutorial
misconduct, the Court held that the crux of the due process analysis is
the overall fairness of the trial, rather than the culpability of the
prosecutor. m The Court also found that the goal of due process is
"not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but
avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused."13 1 The Court has also
stressed that judges are not free to impose their own personal notions
of fairness in a due process analysis, but instead should "determine
only whether the action complained of... violates those fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions and which define the community's sense of fair play and
decency.""'
Although due process itself remains difficult to define, the Supreme
Court has identified certain principles that shed light on the
constitutionality of prosecutors' conduct during trial. For example, in
Mooney v. Holohan,14 ' the Court established that a prosecutor's
knowing use of false testimony violated the Due Process Clause."* In
Mooney, the Court found that a prosecutor's "deliberate deception"
of the Court by presenting perjured testimony was "inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of justice.'1 3
The Supreme Court
. 4 In Alcorta,
expanded due process protection in Alcorta v. TexasY
the prosecutor permitted a witness testifying for the State to present
false testimony regarding an illicit relationship that the witness had

133. 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
134. Id. at 651 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
135. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 24.
136. See id. at 24-25.
137. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
138. See id. at 219.
139. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
140. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990) (internal quotations
omitted) (citations omitted).
141. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
142. See id. at 112.
143. Id.
144. 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
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with the victim. 145 This false testimony was highly prejudicial to the
defendant, as it negated the defendant's claim that he killed the
victim-his wife-in a fit of passion after happening upon the victim
kissing the witness. 146 The Court found that by allowing the false
evidence, although unsolicited, to go uncorrected, the prosecutor had
violated the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. 47
The Supreme Court further extended due process protection
against prosecutorial misconduct in Napue v. Illinois.148 There, the
prosecutor allowed the State's primary witness to lie about the fact
that the prosecutor had promised the witness a reduced sentence for
his testimony.1 49 The Court found that a prosecutor's duty to correct
evidence known to be false applies even if the evidence goes only to
the witness's credibility. 5 ' The Court stated that "[a] lie is a lie, no
matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the
[prosecutor] has the responsibility
and duty to correct what he knows
5
to be false and elicit the truth.' '
These cases recognize that prosecutors have a special duty not to
deceive the court.15 2 Moreover, these cases contain an underlying
premise that prosecutors have a personal responsibility to ensure that
false evidence is not introduced at trial. This premise is consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland.5 3 In Brady,
the court found that a prosecutor's failure to turn over evidence
material to the defendant's guilt or punishment violated the
defendant's due process rights.154 Read together, Brady and the falseevidence cases suggest that courts have little tolerance for
prosecutorial deception, whether intentional or not, that affects the
trier of fact's determination of the defendant's guilt. In short, due
process imposes on prosecutors an obligation to ensure that the
evidence introduced at trial is, in fact, truthful. When the prosecutor
fails to meet this burden, whether intentionally or not, courts have
found that the defendant's right to a fair trial has been violated. 55

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 29-30.
See id. at 28-31.
See id. at 31.
360 U.S. 264 (1959).
See id. at 271.

150. See id. at 269.

151. Id. at 269-70 (internal quotations omitted).
152. See United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365,367 (2d Cir. 1962).
153. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

154. See id. at 87.

155. See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text; see also Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972) (holding that the prosecutor's failure to disclose
vital evidence to the defense, whether intentional or not, entitled defendant to a new
trial); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (reaffirming the well-established principle
that the Due Process Clause cannot tolerate a conviction obtained by false evidence).
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2. Certainty of Facts

Although it is clear that prosecutors may not present evidence they
know to be false, it is unclear whether prosecutors must personally
believe that the evidence they introduce at trial is in fact true.
Moreover, the threshold level of certainty that prosecutors must
possess in order to introduce evidence at trial also remains undefined.
Realistically, prosecutors can never know with absolute certainty what
actually occurred during a crime, and therefore, whether the evidence
that they introduce at trial is in fact truthful.Y This reality convinces
some commentators that prosecutors are entitled to remain agnostic
about the veracity of the evidence presented at trial, while
presenting
7
the most inculpatory evidence against the defendant.'The ABA ethical codes also suggest that a prosecutor need not be
personally convinced of the truth of the evidence in order to introduce
that evidence at trial. 58 While the codes prohibit prosecutors from
presenting evidence that they know is false,5 9 they nowhere require
prosecutors to believe the factual arguments that they make at trial.
Rather, other areas of the ethical codes suggest that the prosecutor's
personal opinion is irrelevant.16 For example, the codes clearly
restrict prosecutors from expressing their personal opinions about the
truth or falsity of the testimony, the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, or the credibility of a witness during trial.'6'

These

156. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1071 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
157. See, e.g., id. ("I cannot see that [due process] encompasses the right to have a
prosecutor who is convinced of the defendant's guilt.").
15& See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102 (1980); Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1997); Standards Relating to the Admin. of
Criminal Justice Standard 3-5.6(a) (1992).
159. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(4) ("In his
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: [k]nowingly use perjured testimony or
false evidence."); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(4) ("A lawyer
shall not knowingly: offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures."); Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal
Justice Standard 3-5.6(a) ("A prosecutor should not knowingly offer false evidence,
whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to
seek withdrawal thereof upon discovery of its falsity.").
160. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(4); Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 3A(e); Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal
Justice Standard 3-5.8(b).
161. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(4) ("In
appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: [a]ssert his
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to
the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused....");
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3A(e) ("A lawyer shall not... state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused. .. ."); Standards
Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-5.8(b) ("The prosecutor should
not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any
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prohibitions suggest that a prosecutor does not violate the ethical
codes when she remains agnostic about the truth or falsity of the
evidence and simply makes the most persuasive factual arguments
from the evidence to prove a defendant's guilt.
Therefore, prosecutors possess virtually unfettered discretion to
institute charges against a suspect once they meet the mere "probable
cause" standard. The next part will discuss the ways in which courts
have dealt with a prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories of a
crime in successive trials.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO A PROSECUTOR'S USE OF INCONSISTENT
FACTUAL THEORIES

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed a prosecutor's use of
inconsistent factual theories of a case in successive trials. However,
lower courts and an individual justice of the Supreme Court have
addressed the constitutionality of this prosecutorial conduct when
reviewing defendants' habeas corpus petitions; 162 consequently, these
courts have focused primarily on the due process grounds necessary to
overturn a state criminal conviction. 163 The lower courts have
responded quite differently to this issue, disagreeing on both how to
analyze the prosecutor's conduct and whether the conduct itself
violates the Constitution. Some courts and individual judges have
found that a prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories of a case
in successive trials violates a defendant's due process rights, 164 while
others have found it to be constitutionally permissible. 165 This part
testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.").

162. The writ of habeas corpus, recognized but not defined by the Constitution,
provides for federal court review of both state and federal prisoners' claims that they

are being held in violation of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (stating
that "the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of

Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(1994) (state prisoners); id. § 2255 (federal prisoners). When reviewing state court
decisions, the Supreme Court has determined that "it is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions," but
rather to determine "whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Before receiving
federal habeas review, however, state prisoners must satisfy a series of prerequisites,
including the exhaustion of all state remedies and overcoming any procedural bars to

review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c).
163. See infra part II.A.
164. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc),
rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1470 (11th Cir. 1985)
(Clark, J., concurring); Nichols v. Collins, 802 F. Supp. 66, 72-75 (S.D. Tex. 1992),

rev'd sub nom. Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255 (5th Cir. 1995). Justice Stevens also
suggested that the prosecutor violated due process by presenting inconsistent factual

theories of a crime in Jacobs v. Scott. See Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067, 1068 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. See Nichols, 69 F.3d at 1282; Jacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319, 1326 (5th Cir. 1994);
State v. Roach, 680 A.2d 634, 640 (N.J. 1996).
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will identify and critique the different approaches that courts have
used when addressing a prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories of
the same crime in successive trials.
A. Violation of the Due ProcessProhibitionAgainst PresentingFalse
Evidence
In approaching a prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories of a crime
in successive trials, courts have predominantly focused on the
prosecutor's duty to avoid knowingly presenting false evidence at
trial. One circuit court of appeals, one district court, one Supreme
Court Justice, and one appellate court judge have found that a
prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories in successive trials
violates the Due Process Clause because the prosecutor knowingly
presented false evidence during trial.166 In Thompson v. Calderon,167
the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, granted Thompson's writ of habeas
corpus due to ineffective assistance of counsel during trial.168
Furthermore, a plurality of the court found that the prosecutor's use
of fundamentally inconsistent theories during the trials of Thompson
and Leitch violated due process. 169 The court found that "it is well
established that when no new significant evidence comes to light a
prosecutor cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate
trials, offer inconsistent theories and facts regarding the same
crime."' 170 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied both on the
prosecutor's duty to administer justice and the prohibition against
knowingly presenting false evidence at trial.17 1 Even judges who did
not join the172plurality on this issue found the prosecutor's conduct
"unseemly"' and a clear violation of due process.173
The Thompson court quoted extensively from Judge Clark's
concurring opinion in Drake v. Kemp, 74 an Eleventh Circuit case with
facts remarkably similar to Thompson. Quoting Judge Clark, the
Ninth Circuit declared that:
[The] flip flopping of theories of the offense was inherently
166. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1057-59; Drake, 762 F.2d at 1470 (Clark, J.,
concurring); Nichols, 802 F. Supp. at 72-75.
167. 120 F3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); see supra
notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
16& See Thompson, 120 F3d at 1051-55.
169. See icl. at 1055-59. In fact, a majority of the court found that a prosecutor's use
of inconsistent theories in successive trials violated due process. See id. at 1063.
However, Judge Tashima, joined by Judge Thomas, believed that the district court
should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant was
prejudiced by the due process violation. See i. at 1064 (Tashima, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 1058.
171. See id.
172. Id. at 1070-72 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 1063-64 (Tashima, J., concurring).
174. 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985).
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unfair. Under the peculiar facts of this case the actions by the
prosecutor violate the fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice.
The state cannot divide and conquer in this manner. Such actions
reduce criminal trials to mere gamesmanship and rob them of their
supposed search for truth.175
decision in
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit's
1 76
Thompson because of an unrelated procedural error.
Likewise, in Nichols v. Collins,"7 a Southern District of Texas judge
found that the prosecutor knowingly presented false evidence at
Nichols's trial.178
Finding that Williams's trial had previously
established that Williams fired the fatal shot, the court held that the
evidence presented in Nichols's trial that Nichols had fired the fatal
shot was "necessarily false.' 1 79 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed
the district court's decision."
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens also highlighted the
prosecutor's duty to avoid presenting false evidence in his dissent to
the denial of a stay of execution in Jacobs v. Scott. 81 Justice Stevens
found that a prosecutor's inconsistent positions in successive trials
"surely raises a serious question of prosecutorial misconduct." 1'
Justice Stevens called Texas's insistence on proceeding with Jacobs's
execution "deeply troubling" in light of the prosecutor's repudiation
of the factual theory used to convict Jacobs.'"3 As Justice Stevens
indicated, "[i]f the prosecutor's statements at the Hogan trial were
correct, then Jacobs is innocent of capital murder."' 4 Justice Stevens
concluded that it would be fundamentally unfair to execute a person
on the basis of a factual determination that the state has formally
disavowed 85
The most detailed explanation of how a prosecutor knowingly
presents false evidence when she argues inconsistent theories of a case

175. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1059 (quoting Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1479
(11th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
176. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998) (finding that the Ninth
Circuit abused its discretion when it sua sponte recalled its mandate to revisit the
merits of a denial of habeas corpus relief to Thompson).
177. 802 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Tex. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255
(5th Cir. 1995); see supra notes 15-23.
178. See Nichols, 802 F. Supp. at 72-75.
179. Id. at 75.
180. See Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255 (5th Cir. 1995); see also infra notes 201-12
and accompanying text.
181. 513 U.S. 1067, 1069 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Jacobs v. Scott, 31
F.3d 1319 (5th Cir. 1994); supra notes 24-34 for a complete description of the Jacobs
case.
182. Jacobs,513 U.S. at 1069.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
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in successive trials is found in Drake v. Kemp."s In Drake, the
Eleventh Circuit granted habeas corpus relief to a defendant
convicted of murder due to a defective jury instruction at trial.1s
Judge Clark wrote a concurring opinion to address in detail the
prosecutor's presentation of inconsistent factual theories in successive
trials.'88 Judge Clark found that "[t]he conclusion seems inescapable
that the prosecutor obtained [the defendant's] conviction through the
use of testimony he did not believe; bringing this case under the
logical if not actual factual framework of Mooney and Napue."1 9
Judge Clark, while acknowledging that it was not clear what the
prosecutor actually believed,"g concluded that:
Obviously the prosecutor either believed or did not believe [the first
defendant]. If he did believe him, then the prosecutor should not
have prosecuted [the first defendant] or, once he decided that he
believed [the first defendant's] story (if this was after [his] trial), he
should have taken steps to correct the error. If he did not believe
[the first defendant], then the prosecutor used testimony he thought
was false in order to convict [the second defendant]. 9
Ironically, this description identifies the flaw in the conclusion that
a prosecutor knowingly presents false evidence when she argues
inconsistent theories of a case in successive trials. Judge Clark, like
the Ninth Circuit in Thompson v. Calderon'91and the district court in
Nichols v. Collins, 93 assumed that the prosecutor either believed or
did not believe the evidence. This assumption, while logical, is
unsound. For, as discussed above, a prosecutor may in fact remain
agnostic about the truth or falsity of the evidence and thus not
knowingly present false evidence in either trial.'
Therefore,
remaining agnostic about the evidence and presenting the best
evidence available against each defendant allows the prosecutor to
avoid the constitutional and ethical prohibitions against knowingly
presenting false evidence.
The New Jersey Supreme Court case of State v. Roach'95 illustrates
186. 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985).
187. See id.
at 1461.
18& See i. at 1470-79 (Clark, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 1479 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) and Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959)).
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
193. 802 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Tex. 1992), rev'd sub nora. Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255
(5th Cir. 1995).
194. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1071 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("A prosecutor, like
any other lawyer, is entitled to retain skepticism about the evidence he presents and
trust the jury to make the right judgment."); see also Dershowitz, supra note 63, at xiv
(noting that a typical prosecutor will not deliberately suborn perjury, but may
nonetheless introduce evidence despite a suspicion that the witness is lying).
195. 680 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996).
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one court's acceptance of this agnosticism. In Roach, the prosecutor
argued that the defendant had acted as one of the gunmen in a
murder.1 16 In three separate trials of the co-defendants, however, the
same prosecutor argued that Roach had not been one of the gunmen
in the murder."9 The court found that the prosecutor had not violated
the defendant's due process rights, but rather had "properly presented
different, plausible interpretations of the conflicting evidence.""19 The
court concluded that:
Within the bounds set by the available inferences to be drawn from
the evidence, the prosecutor is entitled to present the strongest case
against each defendant provided the State has not compromised that
evidence or engaged in representations on which the courts have
relied or that have prejudiced the defendant. 19
This analysis, quite similar to the "leave it to the jury" charging
philosophy discussed above, 200 recognizes that prosecutors do not
necessarily knowingly present false evidence when they argue
inconsistent theories of a case in successive trials. Instead, by
remaining agnostic about the truth or falsity of the evidence,
prosecutors are able to circumvent the ethical and constitutional
prohibition against knowingly presenting false evidence at trial.
B. ProsecutorsAre Estopped From PresentingInconsistent Factual
Theories
A second approach to a prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual
theories in successive trials centers on the estoppel doctrine. In
Nichols, the district court, in addition to finding that the prosecutor
knowingly presented false evidence, held that the prosecutor was
constitutionally estopped from using inconsistent factual theories of a
case in successive trials.201 The court determined that because only
one bullet killed the victim, due process permitted only one person to
be charged with firing the fatal shot. 2 Otherwise, the court feared
that the State could convict an unlimited number of individuals for the
very same act.203
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and found that its
estoppel analysis was incorrect. 2°4 The court based its decision on four

196. See id. at 638-41.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 640.
199. Id.
200. See supra part I.B.2.a.
201. See Nichols v. Collins, 802 F. Supp. 66, 74 (S.D. Tex. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255 (5th Cir. 1995).
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1268 (5th Cir. 1995).
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factors. First, the court found that collateral estoppel applied only
to actions between the same parties. 6 Because Nichols was not a
party in Williams's trial, he failed to meet this requirement.' Second,
the court found that collateral estoppel did not apply because
Williams's trial never established that Williams fired the fatal shot.M
Rather, the court maintained that the jury did not determine who
fired the fatal shot and that the indictment and evidence were
immaterial because Williams pled guilty. 9 Third, the court found
that the "obscure doctrine" of judicial estoppel did not apply to
Nichols because it was not constitutionally mandated and had never
been applied against the government in a criminal case.210 Lastly, the
court found that applying any form of estoppel against the State in
Nichols's trial would have been an unconstitutional application of "a
new rule of constitutional law not dictated by precedent existing at the
time Nichols's conviction became final."2 Thus, as the Fifth Circuit's
analysis indicates, estoppel should not prohibit a prosecutor
from
2
using inconsistent factual theories in successive trials?1
C. Courts Have an Independent Obligationto MaintainFairnessand
Integrity
Courts have also examined the effect that a prosecutor's use of
inconsistent factual theories in successive trials has on the public's
confidence in the judicial system. For example, the district court in
Nichols pointed out that such conduct calls into question the integrity
of the judicial process.2?13 The court noted that "the integrity of the
judicial system commands that citizens can rest assured that
prosecutors are seeking truth and justice; and that when they find
truth and justice they cannot seek a different truth and a different
justice from the first. 21 4 The court's concern for the public's
perception of the integrity and fairness of the judicial system
205. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, requires that once an issue
of ultimate fact has been determined by a final judgment, that issue cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.s. 436,443 (1970).
206. See Nichols, 69 F.3d at 1270.

207. See id.
208. See il.
209. See id. at 1270-71.
210. See id- at 1272.
21L Id. at 1273.

212- See id. at 1268-74; see also United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378-79 (5th
Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply judicial estoppel absent "egregious" conduct by the
prosecution); United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 129-30 n.7 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting
that judicial estoppel has never been applied against the government in a criminal
case).
213. See Nichols v. Collins, 802 F. Supp. 66, 74 (S.D. Tex. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255 (5th Cir. 1995).

214. Id.
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influenced its finding that a prosecutor violated due 215process by
presenting inconsistent factual theories in successive trials.
However, courts are not in general agreement on this point.
Contrary to the district court's decision in Nichols, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in State v. Roach2 16 held that the prosecutor's use of
inconsistent factual theories did not compromise the integrity of the
courts. 17 The New Jersey Supreme Court's finding, however, does
not properly consider the responsibility that courts owe to citizens to
demonstrate integrity and to maintain the appearance of fairness. The
United States Supreme Court has emphasized that courts have an
obligation to preserve their integrity by ensuring that proceedings
comport with society's notions of fairness. In Wheat v. United
States,21 8 a case dealing with potential confficts of interest, Chief
Justice Rehnquist asserted that "courts have an independent interest
in ensuring that... legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe
them. '219 The district court in Nichols properly recognized this
independent interest in maintaining fairness by finding that a
prosecutor's inconsistent factual arguments in successive trials
violated due process.10 If the court had allowed the prosecutor to
argue inconsistent factual theories in successive trials, it would have
violated its independent duty to ensure the appearance of fairness and
integrity.
Moreover, on a practical level, a court's tacit approval of a
prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories in successive trials
undermines the efficacy of the criminal justice system because citizens
lose faith in the court's ability to guarantee fair trials. As the district
court in Nichols noted, a state owes a duty to its citizens to promote
the goals of truth and justice."l When the court permits the state to
breach this duty by arguing inconsistent factual theories of a crime in
successive trials, citizens lose confidence in both the courts and the
state.
This loss of credibility can be dangerous for the entire
criminal justice system because the system relies on impartial citizens,
serving as jurors, to decide a defendant's guilt. - When citizens do
not have faith in the court's ability to guarantee fair trials, this system
is compromised.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See id.
680 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996).
See id. at 640.
486 U.S. 153 (1988).
Id.
See Nichols, 802 F. Supp. at 74.

221. See id.
222. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Whether or not the United States Constitution allows
[prosecutors] to argue inconsistent theories to different juries, it surely does not
inspire public confidence in our criminal justice system for prosecutors to leave
themselves open to charges of manipulation."), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
223. See id.
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D. PriorInconsistentArgument is Admissible in a Subsequent Trial
Finally, some courts have analyzed a prosecutor's use of
inconsistent factual theories in successive trials as an evidentiary
issue 24 This analysis arises during the trial of the second defendant
for the exact same crime for which the first defendant was convicted.
In the second defendant's trial, the defendant attempts to admit the
prosecutor's jury argument from the first defendant's trial as an
admission of a party-opponent pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2). Under Rule 801(d)(2), a statement made or adopted by a
party, or made by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, is admissible against that party. 5
The admissibility of attorney statements from a prior trial stems
from the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. McKeon.5 In
McKeon, the defendant's first two trials both ended in mistrials."
During the defense attorney's opening statement at the third trial, he
made an argument that was "facially and irreconcilably at odds" vith
an argument that he had made during the second trial.5 The
government sought to use the defense counsel's prior inconsistent
statement as a party admission under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2) to demonstrate the defendant's consciousness of guilt. 9
The Second Circuit held that prior opening statements are admissible
in criminal cases under limited conditions.m The court found that
"[t]o hold otherwise would not only invite abuse and sharp practice
but would also weaken confidence in the justice system itself by
denying the function of trials as truth-seeking proceedings." 31
Moreover, the court declared that the truth-seeking function of trials
is subverted when parties are free to make fundamental changes in the
versions of facts between trials and to conceal these changes from the

224. See United States v. DeLoach, 34 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811-12 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S.
317 (1992); United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1991); United

States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30-34 (2d Cir. 1984); Hoover v. State, 552 So. 2d 834,
839-40 (Miss. 1989); State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 579 N.W.2d 678,685 (Wis. 1998).

225. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B)-(C).
226. 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984).

227. See id at 28.
228. Id. at 33.
229. See id.at 29.

230. See id.at 31-34. In order for prior statements to be admissible, three
conditions must be satisfied. First, "the district court must be satisfied that the prior

argument involves an assertion of fact inconsistent with similar assertions in a
subsequent trial." Id. at 33. Second, the court must determine that "the statements of
counsel were such as to be the equivalent of testimonial statements" made by the
client. Id. Finally, the district court must determine by a preponderance of the
evidence that the inference that the party seeking admission of the statements wishes
to draw "is a fair one and that an innocent explanation for the inconsistency does not
exist." Id.
231. Id. at 31.
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trier of fact. 211
Although McKeon dealt with the admissibility of defense counsel's
arguments, courts have applied the same principles to admit the prior
inconsistent arguments of prosecutors. 3 For example, in United
States v. GAF Corp.,' the prosecution amended its bill of particulars
between the second and third trials of the same defendants. 235 The
defense sought to introduce the original bill of particulars as a party
admission to establish weaknesses in the government's case. 6 The
Second Circuit held that "if the government chooses to change its
strategy at successive trials, and contradict its previous theories of the
case and version of the historical facts, the jury is entitled to be aware
of what the government has previously claimed, and accord whatever
weight it deems appropriate to such information." 237 As in McKeon,
the court relied on considerations of fairness and the integrity of the
truth-seeking function of trials to support its decision. 38
Furthermore, at least one court has extended the admissibility of a
prosecutor's prior inconsistent statements to cases involving the
successive trials of different defendants. In Hoover v. State,29 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the arguments of a
prosecutor in the previous trial of a co-indictee were admissible in the
trial of another co-indictee.24 ° In Hoover, a case very similar to
Roach,4 1 the prosecutor argued inconsistent factual theories of a
shooting in successive trials.242 After convicting the first defendant of
the shooting in the first trial, the prosecutor subsequently argued that
Hoover had shot the victim in Hoover's trial. 3 The court relied on
the same reasoning as McKeon to find that the prosecutor's
statements in the trial of the first co-indictee were admissible.22
McKeon and its progeny confirm that allowing parties to make
inconsistent arguments in successive trials without alerting the jury to
those inconsistencies subverts the truth-seeking function of trials.245
23Z See id. As further support for its finding, the court noted the admissibility of
superseded pleadings in civil litigation as party admissions. See id.
233. See United States v. DeLoach, 34 F.3d 1001,1005-06 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811-12 (2d Cir. 1991) rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S.
317 (1992); United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1991);
Hoover v. State, 552 So. 2d 834, 839-40 (Miss. 1989); State v. Cardenas-Hernandez,
579 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Wis. 1998).
234. 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991).
235. See id. at 1257.
236. See id. at 1257-59.
237. Id. at 1262.
238. See id. at 1260.
239. 552 So. 2d 834 (Miss. 1989).
240. See id. at 840.
241. 680 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996).
242. See Hoover, 552 So. 2d at 838.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 840.
245. See United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26,30-34 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Moreover, these cases highlight the fundamental unfairness that
would result if parties were allowed to alter their theories of a case
between trials. 46 The underlying theme of unfairness that permeates
McKeon and its progeny reveals that a defendant's due process rights
to a fair trial are at stake when a prosecutor argues inconsistent
theories of a crime in successive trials.2 47
While courts have used various approaches to confront a
prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories of a crime in
successive trials, part III argues that they have not yet identified the
most serious aspect of this prosecutorial conduct.
Im. PROSECUTORS' USE OF INCONSISTENT FACTUAL THEORIES
VIOLATES THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL LIMITATIONS

This part asserts that prosecutors violate the Due Process Clause
and their ethical responsibilities when they present an inconsistent
factual theory in successive trials without disavowing the theory used
in the first trial.
A. Violation of In re Winship Doctrine
Courts have thus far failed to identify the most significant and
alarming aspect of the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories in
successive trials. That is, when a prosecutor argues inconsistent
factual theories in successive trials, the prosecutor creates too great a
risk that an innocent person will be convicted. Placing an innocent
person in danger of conviction is unacceptable because our criminal
justice system is based on the fundamental principle that it is far worse
to convict an innocent person than to let a guilty person go free.41
This principle, expressed by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in In re
Winship.19 requires that prosecutors refrain from activity that poses
too great a risk of convicting an innocent person. 2m Justice Holmes
illustrated this principle in Olmstead v. United States51 when he said,
"I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part."
When a prosecutor charges two suspects with an offense that could
only have been committed by one person, and presents inconsistent
theories of the commission of the offense in successive trials, the
246. See United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253,1260 (2d Cir. 1991).
247. See id.; McKeon, 738 F.2d at 30-34.

248. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358,372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

249. 397 U.S. 358,372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
250. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,256-58 (1967) (White, J., concurring)
("Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make sure
that they do not convict the innocent.").
251. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
252- Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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prosecutor necessarily subjects one innocent defendant to
conviction.'- 3 In this situation, the prosecutor's conduct cannot
withstand due process scrutiny. As discussed above, the Supreme
Court has maintained that due process is implicated only when a
prosecutor's actions violate "those fundamental conceptions of justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions and which
define the community's sense of fair play and decency."'' - When a
prosecutor argues inconsistent theories in successive trials, the
prosecutor violates a fundamental conception of justice on which our
criminal justice system is based; that is, the prosecutor necessarily
violates the fundamental conception that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. Since one of the
defendants is necessarily innocent of the crime charged,2 5 the
prosecutor has breached a fundamental tenet of our country's criminal
justice system, and thus, violated the defendant's due process rights.
The prosecutor's conduct is even more troubling in cases like
Nichols, 6 where the use of inconsistent factual arguments results in
death sentences for both defendants.'-'
Because the evidence
established that only one person committed the most serious
offense,258 one defendant received a sentence of capital punishment
for a crime that he did not commit. Although the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that due process does not require that every
conceivable step be taken to eliminate the possibility of convicting an
innocent person,259 a prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories at
successive trials poses such a substantial risk of convicting an innocent
person that it cannot be constitutionally acceptable.
Supreme Court decisions have long confirmed that prosecutors
must refrain from conduct that poses too great a risk of convicting an
innocent person. In Berger v. United States,- ° for example, the Court
identified limits, albeit vague limits, to a prosecutor's conduct in
pursuit of a conviction. 61 In Berger, the Court found that a

prosecutor:
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.
253. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1071 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("If A and B cannot both be guilty, we then know that one
innocent person has been convicted."), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
254. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990) (quoting United States
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).
255. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1071 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
256. Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255 (5th Cir. 1995); see supra notes 15-23 and
accompanying text.
257. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1072 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("The danger is
particularly grave in capital cases, where the manipulation could well cause the
execution of an innocent person.").
258. See Nichols, 69 F.3d at 1259-60.
259. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,208 (1977).
260. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
261. See id. at 84-89.
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But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.
The duty to "refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction" was extended with the false-evidence casesMooney, Alcorta, and Napue--discussed above.m In those cases, the
prosecutor's knowing presentation of false evidence, or failure to
correct false evidence, created too great a risk that an innocent person
would be convicted of a crime.6 Therefore, the Supreme Court
found that the prosecutor's knowing presentation of false evidence
violated the defendant's due process rights.6
The Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland6 further
illustrates the principle that prosecutors must refrain from conduct
that places innocent people in danger of conviction. The Brady court
reasoned that "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted
but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." 7 Thus, the
Brady court identified and prohibited prosecutorial conduct that
posed too great a risk that an innocent person would be convicted.
While a prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories in successive trials
is different from Berger, Mooney, and Brady in that the due process
violation occurs because of the prosecutor's action in successive trials
rather than within a single trial, the same principles that established
due process violations in those cases apply here. Indeed, finding a due
process violation here is simply an extension of the principles
elaborated in the Court's previous due process cases. Like the
situation in which a prosecutor knowingly presents false evidence or
does not turn over exculpatory evidence, here the prosecutor's actions
do not comport with "fundamental fairness" because the prosecutor
has created too great a risk that an innocent person will be convicted.
Therefore, as the courts in Berger, Mooney, and Brady held, the
prosecutor's actions violate the defendant's due process rights.
The fact that the prosecutor is uncertain which set of evidence
introduced at the two trials is in fact false does not mitigate the due
process violation. On the contrary, when a prosecutor argues
inconsistent factual theories of a crime, the prosecutor necessarily
subjects one person to conviction for a crime that he/she did not
commit. Unlike the knowing presentation of false evidence, where
the prosecutor's subjective knowledge of the falsity is required, here
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 88.
See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
See id.

266. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
267. Id. at 87.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the prosecutor's agnosticism is irrelevant because the fact remains that
one person has been falsely convicted. Under the Winship principle,
regardless of the prosecutor's subjective intent or knowledge, the
conviction of an innocent defendant violates the Due Process Clause.
Therefore, agnosticism as to the truth or falsity of the evidence cannot
shield prosecutors from the due process violation committed when an
innocent person is convicted of a crime.
Some prosecutors may argue that they are justified in presenting
inconsistent factual theories because, despite the fact that only one
defendant committed the most serious offense, both defendants are
guilty of crimes and pose a threat to society. This rationalization,
however, does not comport with the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has consistently held that the Due Process Clause protects a
defendant against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which the
defendant is charged.2 s The fact that the defendant may have
committed another serious crime does not mitigate the injustice of
convicting the defendant for a crime that he did not commit.
Addressing this exact point, the Supreme Court has confirmed that
"[u]nder our system of criminal justice even a thief is entitled to
complain that he has been unconstitutionally convicted and
imprisoned as a burglar. 2 69 Therefore, the prosecutor's use of
inconsistent theories of a crime in successive trials cannot be justified
based on the theory that both defendants are deserving of
punishment.
The prosecutor's duty not to create too great a risk of convicting an
innocent person is even more crucial given the reality that triers of
fact sometimes make mistakes. Despite the constitutional provisions
in place to ensure against the risk of convicting an innocent person,27°
the reality is that the trier of fact-be it a judge or a jury-will
occasionally make erroneous factual conclusions.2
Chief Justice
Rehnquist confirmed this fallibility in Herrera v. Collins,72 when he
pointed out that history is fraught with examples of wrongly convicted
persons who later established their innocence.2 73 Given the fact that
the system and the people who operate the system make mistakes, the
prosecutor's duty not to put an individual at risk of being mistakenly
convicted becomes even more important.
B. ProsecutorsViolate Their "Seek Justice" Obligation
In addition to violating a defendant's due process rights, a
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979).
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,398-99 (1993).
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
See id. at 415.
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prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories in successive trials violates
the prosecutor's ethical duty to "seek justice." While courts cannot
reverse convictions on the basis of an ethics violation, they frequently
highlight these violations to lend credibility to their analyses.7 For
example, both the Ninth Circuit plurality in Thompson and Judge
Clark's concurrence in Drake identified the prosecutor's violation of
her unique duty to "seek justice" as one of the justifications for
finding that the prosecutor violated due processV 5 Moreover, the
ABA ethical codes shed light on exactly how prosecutors violate the
"seek justice" mandate when they present patently inconsistent
theories in successive trials. The Model Code explains that the
prosecutor's special duty to "seek justice" exists because "in our
system of criminal justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all
reasonable doubts."' 2 76 Additionally, the Model Rules clarify that the
prosecutor's unique duty to administer justice carries with it a specificn
obligation to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice.2
Professor Fred C. Zacharias offers another interpretation of the
prosecutor's "seek justice" obligation!"' Professor Zacharias argues
that this obligation requires prosecutors to help restore the adversarial
balance when the system breaks down, rather than exploiting the
breakdown to obtain a conviction? 9
Although the "seek justice" admonition is admittedly vague,0 it is
plainly violated when a prosecutor argues inconsistent factual theories
in successive trials. This violation occurs because the prosecutor's
conduct contradicts the express language of the ethical codes. First,
the prosecutor violates the ABA ethical codes' explanation for the
"seek justice" admonition. Contrary to the codes, a prosecutor who
argues inconsistent theories of a crime in successive trials does not
ensure that the accused receives the benefit of all reasonable doubt or
that the defendant receives procedural justice. Instead, the prosecutor
subjects the defendant to procedural injustice by charging and trying
the defendant with a crime that the defendant may not have
committed. Additionally, the prosecutor exploits the doubt that exists
in the case, rather than giving the defendant the benefit of all
reasonable doubt as the codes require. Finally, contrary to Professor
274. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc),
rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1478 (11th Cir. 1985)
(Clark, J., concurring).
275. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1058; Drake, 762 F.2d at 1478 (Clark, J.,
concurring). But see State v. Roach, 680 A.2d 634, 639 (NJ. 1996) (finding that the
prosecutor did not violate his duty to seek justice).
276. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1980).
277. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. (1997).
278. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice.:
Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45,46-50 (1991).
279. See id.
at 64.
280. See id- at 46-50.
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Zacharias's interpretation, the prosecutor's conduct does not seek to
restore adversarial balance, but rather exploits the imbalance to
obtain two convictions.
Second, the prosecutor's conduct violates the "seek justice" duty
Berger, in addition to
expressed in Berger v. United States."
highlighting the prosecutor's duty to administer justice, clearly
established a limit to prosecutorial behavior.m' As noted above,
Berger established that prosecutors may not engage in "improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction."'283 Clearly,
Berger identified a fine line that exists between acceptable advocacy
and impermissible conduct by a prosecutor. While unable to establish
a definitive test to discern between the two,284 the Court nonetheless
maintained that certain conduct is simply unacceptable in light of the
prosecutor's duty to seek justice.
Thus, according to Berger, a prosecutor who argues inconsistent
factual theories in successive trials crosses the line from acceptable
advocacy to improper conduct. This prosecutorial tactic exemplifies
an "improper method" because the prosecutor has abandoned fair
play and instead relied on deception and manipulation. By presenting
inconsistent factual theories, the prosecutor represents two versions of
the "truth" to the juries. Clearly, justice cannot tolerate two versions
of the truth. Even prosecutors who believe that "seeking justice"
means simply doing whatever is necessary to convict people whom
they feel are guilty' cannot justify this conduct because here the
evidence has established that only one person committed the crime.
In short, this conduct is so antithetical to fair play and decency that it
violates the prosecutor's duty to "seek justice."
C. Implications of the Winship Principleon Prosecutors'Arguments
Under the Winship principle, a prosecutor's presentation of
inconsistent factual theories in successive trials violates due process
because of the substantial risk of convicting an innocent person. The
only way that a prosecutor can overcome this presumption is if, before
making the inconsistent argument at a second trial, a prosecutor takes
affirmative steps to repudiate the factual theory used in the first trial.
Prosecutors are certainly free to change their minds about the
circumstances surrounding the commission of a crime. In order to
change their theory of the crime, however, prosecutors must
demonstrate their good faith by taking action to rectify what they now
know to be false evidence offered in the first trial. 6 The ABA Model
281. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).

282. See id. at 88.
283. Id.

284. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
285. See Zacharias, supra note 278, at 60 n.70.
286. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
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Rules require a lawyer who comes to know of the falsity of evidence
previously offered to take "reasonable remedial measures."' '
While
this instruction is vague, a prosecutor would be expected to inform the
court of the falsity of the evidence presented at the first trial and
request that the court set aside the defendant's conviction.m This
remedial measure would alert the convicted defendant to the
potentially false evidence used in his conviction, as well as
demonstrate that the prosecutor truly has repudiated the factual
theory used in the first trial. Thus, it is only wvith remedial action that
a prosecutor can employ an inconsistent factual theory of a crime in
successive trials without committing a due process violation.
D. Implicationsof the Winship Principleon a Prosecutor'sCharging
Decision
The most significant implication of the Winship principle, however,
occurs in the area of a prosecutor's charging standard. Because
Winship prohibits prosecutors from presenting inconsistent factual
theories in successive trials in order to convict two people of the same
crime, prosecutors must evaluate a suspect's guilt more thoroughly at
the charging stage. In cases where the evidence establishes that only
one person committed the crime, prosecutors cannot charge two
people with the crime and leave it to the jury to determine which
defendant is guilty without violating the Winship principle. Because
the evidence has established that only one person perpetrated the
crime, one of the individuals charged would necessarily be innocent of
the crime yet subject to conviction. The Winship principle requires
that prosecutors make a choice about which suspect to charge with the
crime based on the evidence available to them. For example, in
Thompson v. Calderon, the prosecutor would have to decide before
the first trial whether to charge Thompson or Leitch with commission
of the fatal act. Charging both suspects with an offense that only one
of them could have committed simply creates too great a risk that an
innocent person will be convicted.
Furthermore, the Winship principle requires that prosecutors have a
substantial amount of certainty about the defendant's guilt in order to
file charges. As discussed in detail above, the "probable cause"
charging standard is not sufficient to protect innocent defendants from
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 523 U.S. 538 (1998). In none of the cases discussed
above did any of the prosecutors take any measures to rectify the outcome of the first
trial after changing their factual theory of the case at the second trial. This inaction
leads one to believe that the prosecutors did not have a good faith change of heart
about the factual theories of the case, but rather intended to manipulate the factual
theories in order to obtain two convictions.
287. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1997) ("If a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures.").
288. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1071 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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wrongful conviction.29 Rather, to ensure that innocent people are not
convicted, prosecutors should charge suspects only when they are
personally satisfied of the suspect's guilt. If an informed prosecutor
has doubts about the guilt of the accused, then there exists a serious
risk that a jury may convict an innocent person. This risk is
unacceptable under Winship. Moreover, the ABA Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice point out that a prosecutor's
reasonable doubt about the suspect's guilt permits the prosecutor to
decline prosecution.29 Therefore, prosecutors should maintain a
higher standard, that of personal satisfaction of the suspect's guilt,
before instituting charges against a suspect.
CONCLUSION

Prosecutors violate one of the most basic tenets of our criminal
justice system when they argue inconsistent factual theories in
successive trials where the evidence has conclusively established that
only one person committed the crime. That is, prosecutors violate the
fundamental principle that it is far worse to convict an innocent
person than to let a guilty person go free. This prosecutorial tactic
creates too great a risk that an innocent person will be convicted
because two people face conviction for a crime that only one person
committed. Prosecutors cannot hide behind the shield of agnosticism
and refuse to take a stand on the truth or falsity of the evidence that
they present at trial. Instead, they must engage in rigorous scrutiny of
the available evidence and make a reasoned judgment regarding the
suspect's guilt. This scrutiny must involve being personally satisfied of
the suspect's guilt before instituting charges. Otherwise, prosecutors
abdicate their responsibilities and violate their ethical duties. If a
prosecutor does change her mind about the facts surrounding the
commission of a crime between trials of defendants, the prosecutor
must renounce the factual theory used in the first trial and take
appropriate measures to vacate the conviction of the first defendant.
Therefore, under the In re Winship principle, the prosecutor's use of
inconsistent factual theories in successive trials, without taking any
action to renounce the former theory and conviction, is a violation of
the Due Process Clause.

289. See supra part I.B.2.
290. See Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.9(b)(i)
(1992).

